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We investigate how individuals in the U.S. expect to adjust their labor force 
participation and savings if Social Security benefits were cut by 30 percent. Respondents 
were asked directly what they would do under this scenario.  Using the resulting stated 
choice data we find that respondents would on average reduce spending by 18.2 
percent before retirement and 20.4 percent after retirement. About 34.1% of 
respondents state they would definitely work longer and they would postpone claiming 
Social Security by 1.1 years.  We investigate how working longer and claiming Social 
Security later would compensate partially for the loss in benefits among the individuals 
who are currently working, under the assumption that individuals retire and claim at the 
same time. Individuals would increase their Social Security benefits from the post-
reform level due to additional earnings entering the benefit calculation and a smaller 
early claiming penalty (or higher delayed claiming credit). As a result, the Social Security 
benefit people would receive would drop on average by 21 rather than 30 percent.  Still, 
the net financial loss, even after accounting for additional earnings, is sizeable for 
individuals in the lowest wealth tertile. 
 
JEL: H55, C81, J22 
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• We investigate changes in labor supply and spending in response to a hypothetical 
Social Security reform scenario.  
• We use stated choice data to identify what individuals would do in response to a 30 
percent benefit cut. 
• The majority of our respondents would adjust their behavior under the hypothetical 
scenario. 
• Adjustments include reductions in spending before and after retirement and delayed 
Social Security benefit claiming. 
• Working longer would compensate partially for the loss in benefits, yet there remains 







The U.S. Social Security trust fund (OASI) is predicted to be depleted by 2035 (Board of 
Trustees, 2016).  Although there are several viable reform proposals to restore the 
Social Security system’s long-term solvency, one important element that is critical to the 
success of any reform remains unknown:  How will individuals respond, for example, to 
a cut in their Social Security benefits?  Will individuals work longer or save more or both, 
and how much will their response make up for the cut in benefits?  How would 
whatever individuals do to adjust be split across spending less and working longer?   
It is important to understand how workers might respond to a benefit cut for at 
least two reasons.  First, to evaluate the impact of such a benefit cut on the well-being 
of individuals (i.e., whether responses in behavior will be adequate to buffer the 
shortfalls in benefits and whether this would be the case across all groups of workers). 
Second, the response in individuals’ behavior determines the size of benefit cuts 
required for ensuring the solvency of the Social Security program in the long-run.  If all 
workers decided to work longer to make up for the shortfall in benefits, then Social 
Security revenues would increase more than if workers decided to make up for the 
shortfalls by reducing spending but otherwise sticking with their retirement (and likely 
their Social Security claiming) plans in the absence of reform.  For some workers, 
additional Social Security contributions would only result in a minor increase in their 
annual Social Security benefits, whereas for others the increase in benefits would be 
larger, depending on the worker’s earnings history.   
Despite the relevance from a policy perspective of understanding individuals’ 
behavior in such circumstances, relatively little is known about how people would adjust 
their behavior in case of a reform that would decrease their Social Security benefits.  
Workers have two main ways to respond:  they can work longer and/or save more.  In 
the absence of additional constraints, economic theory predicts that individuals should 
adjust both their saving behavior and the length of their working life (OECD, 2006; 
Martin and Whitehouse, 2008; Gruber and Wise, 2009; Sass et al., 2010; French and 
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Jones, 2012). However, it has been difficult to show empirically how important each one 
of these dimensions is and how these two behaviors interact. Most studies focus on only 
one dimension of adjustment, either on the response to savings or on the response to 
labor force participation, but rarely on both.   
Broadly speaking, there are three types of empirical studies on this topic:  within-
country studies, cross-country studies, and those adopting a structural approach. An 
important challenge for within-country studies is that there tends to be limited 
exogenous variation in Social Security rules that could be exploited. Examples of such 
studies, all focusing on labor supply, include Krueger and Pischke (1992) who investigate 
the effect of the 1977 amendment to the Social Security Act that sharply reduced 
benefits for some cohorts, Friedberg (2000) and Gruber and Orszag (2003) who use 
changes in Social Security rules to investigate the effect of the Social Security earnings 
test, or Mastrobuoni (2009) who investigates the impact of the increase in the normal 
retirement age. While those evaluate the impact of enacted reforms, for obvious 
reasons, policymakers are interested in empirical studies that would inform the design 
of a reform before enacting it. They therefore have to contend with evidence from other 
countries that have implemented reforms. Examples of studies that present evidence of 
this sort are Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) for the United Kingdom, Attanasio and 
Brugiavini for Italy (2003), and Aguila (2011) for Mexico. Yet, differences in pre-reform 
institutional settings and preferences may limit what US policy makers can learn from 
what has happened in other countries. 
Cross-country studies rely on variation in institutions, in particular retirement 
ages, and in pension formulas as exogenous variation to identify the effects of interest.  
Gruber and Wise (1999 and 2004) adopt this approach to study the impact on labor 
force participation while Samwick (2000) studies how the characteristics of social 
security systems influence savings. Hurd, Michaud and Rohwedder (2012) use 
institutional variation in public pension schemes across countries to study variation in 
wealth accumulation.   
  
 5
Beyond within-country and cross-country studies, another way to assess 
individuals’ responses to Social Security reform is to estimate a structural model on data 
of observed choices and conduct policy simulations. Examples of such policies include 
the change in the normal or early retirement age, benefits reduction, increase in payroll 
tax or health insurance provision (e.g., Blau and Gilleskie, 2006; Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 2007; van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008; Laitner and Silverman, 2012). 
While very powerful to simulate the behavioral impact of policies, the challenges of such 
structural models include computational complexities, taking into account institutional 
rules, typically unobserved (while complex) choice sets, and unobserved sources of 
uncertainty faced by decision-makers (e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010). While the 
latter type of studies only take into consideration partial equilibrium effects, there are 
also a few studies looking at the impact of Social Security reforms within a general 
equilibrium framework (e.g., İmrohoroğlu and Kitao, 2009, 2012). 
In this paper, we complement existing studies by adopting a different approach. 
We ask respondents directly what they will do in the case of a cut of 30 percent of their 
Social Security benefits: whether they would work longer, claim Social Security later, 
reduce spending before retirement, and/or reduce spending after retirement. (Answer 
categories were “definitely yes,” “maybe,” and “definitely not.”) For each of these 
options, we follow up with questions to assess the size of the response. The advantage 
of this approach is that it allows us to investigate, without assumptions on individuals’ 
decision-making process or their knowledge of the Social Security system, the 
behavioral response to a reform currently considered before its enactment. Responses 
are those reported by individuals who could be affected by this reform. Using 
respondents’ stated choice, rather than actual choice, is becoming common in many 
fields (Louviere et al., 2000). Comparisons of revealed and stated preference data show 
that both data sets produced comparable utility parameters (e.g., Adamowicz et al., 
1994, Ben-Akiva and Morikawa, 1990, Hensher and Bradley, 1993). Stated intention also 
relates strongly to subsequent actual choice (e.g., Haider and Stephens, 2007; 
Delavande and Manski, 2010). However, stated preferences data are not without 
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caveats and may be susceptible to biases. In particular, the context and format of the 
hypothetical setting have been found to affect the response, and choice model 
estimation results may therefore be sensitive to the elicitation format (Ben-Akiva et al., 
1994). 
The credibility of our results relies on individuals being able to predict how they 
would react to the hypothetical scenario. Whether stated preferences or stated choice 
questions will be successful in eliciting responses that are as close as possible to 
individuals’ actual behavior depends critically on how salient the event is for 
respondents and on whether they have already considered the scenario as a real 
possibility (McFadden, 1998). Several arguments suggest that the scenario we consider 
was salient and realistic, especially at the time of the survey in 2007. The need for Social 
Security reform to restore the solvency of the program has been well advertised in the 
media and by political leaders for a number of years.1  Time and time again, the 
message has been repeated that under current law, full benefits will only be payable 
until sometime in the 2030s; projections vary somewhat from year-to-year.  After that, 
only about 75 percent of benefits will be payable given the current structure of the 
system.  Importantly, workers’ Social Security statements that were mailed out every 
year until 2011 included this same message in bold face, and there is evidence that 
individuals consult their Social Security statement (Mastrobuoni, 2011). Moreover, in 
our sample, respondents believe on average that there is a 61 percent chance that 
Congress will change Social Security sometime in the next 10 years so that it becomes 
less generous than it is currently.2 We focus on a 30 percent cut because this was a 
plausible number discussed at the time of our survey. For example, in 2006, the Social 
Security Board of Trustees (2006) suggested either a payroll tax increase or a cut in 
Social Security benefits by 26 percent in 2040 (the estimated point of trust fund 
exhaustion at the time), with reductions reaching 30 percent in 2080. Finally, the 
                                               
1
 For example, then President Bush launched his initiative “Strengthening Social Security” in 2005.  
2
 This statistic is computed for our analytical sample of respondents who are not receiving Social Security 
benefits at the time of the interview but report a positive probability of receiving Social Security benefit in 
the future (no weights applied). 
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credibility of our results also relies on whether individuals can forecast their Social 
Security benefits. There is evidence that the majority of people have relatively accurate 
expectations about their future Social Security benefits, and that the accuracy improves 
closer to retirement (Rohwedder and Kleinjans, 2006). 
There has been other recent work using similarly stated choice data to look at 
retirement-related issues. For example, Luttmer and Samwick (2015) investigate the 
welfare loss faced by households due to political uncertainty associated with their 
future Social Security benefits. Like us, they ask survey respondents hypothetical 
questions about how they would change behavior (savings, labor supply, bequests) if 
their benefits could be guaranteed. Maurer et al. (2017) use a similar approach asking 
respondents to report their expected claiming age under various benefits payment 
options (e.g., lump sum). Michaud and van Soest (2008) investigate the impact of the 
2000 repeal of the earnings test above the normal retirement age on retirement 
expectations (i.e., individual-specific subjective probability to work full-time past ages 62 
and 65) of male workers. Van Soest, Kapteyn and Zissimopoulos (2007) investigate 
preferences for full and partial retirement by asking survey respondents to rate several 
hypothetical retirement trajectories involving early retirement, late retirement, and 
gradual retirement, each with its own corresponding income path. The major difference 
with respect to this literature is that we consider a different policy, that is realistic and 
salient for the sampled population: a 30% cut of Social Security benefits. Moreover, and 
importantly for policy, we can link these responses to the rich data elicited in the HRS, 
including linked Social Security earnings records which allow us to assess how 
individuals’ behavioral response partially offsets the loss in benefits and to determine 
the actual change in the annual Social Security benefits post-reform. 
We designed a survey module that elicited stated choice data from a subsample 
of respondents to the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) who were interviewed over 
the Internet in the summer of 2007.  We link their answers to the rich background 
information collected in the HRS core survey and to administrative Social Security 
earnings records. About three quarters of our respondents report that they would 
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“definitely” adjust their behavior in the case of a 30 percent cut in their Social Security 
benefits.  Thirty-six percent report that they would only reduce spending, while another 
30 percent report that they would both work longer and reduce spending, underscoring 
the importance of considering these options jointly. At a qualitative level, we find 
important differences in the response by marital status, working status, and 
socioeconomic status (SES).  Non-workers and those living in a couple are less likely to 
report that they would “definitely” work longer or reduce spending, while the opposite 
is true for those with lower education and those belonging to a lower wealth tertile. 
We investigated the magnitude of the adjustment in terms of spending and find 
that respondents would on average reduce their spending by 18.2 percent before 
retirement, and by 20.4 percent after retirement. About two-thirds of the respondents 
who would consider reducing spending before retirement would start doing so 
immediately after the reform’s enactment.  We also conducted a more detailed 
quantitative analysis of respondents’ answers about delaying their claiming of Social 
Security benefits. On average, Social Security claiming would be postponed by 1.08 
years. We investigate how working longer and claiming Social Security later would 
compensate partially for the loss in benefits among the individuals who are currently 
working. If this time was spent working by everyone, then the annual Social Security 
benefit would be adjusted upward because of both the additional earnings and the fact 
that there would be less of an early claiming penalty or a higher delayed claiming 
credit.3  Rather than experiencing a 30 percent drop in the annual benefit, respondents 
would experience a 21 percent drop on average when taking into account their 
adjustments to claiming later and working longer.  Comparing the change in the present 
value of future Social Security benefits to the change in the present value of future 
earnings to assess the net financial effect we find a median net loss of $9,700 or 3.5 
percent of median wealth holdings. 
                                               
3
 In the U.S. Social Security system, claiming benefits and retiring are separate decisions, although the 




The paper is organized as follows. We present the data and survey design in 
Section 2. We investigate the heterogeneity in the behavioral response to a Social 
Security reform by observable characteristics in Section 3. We then assess the 
magnitude of reductions in spending and labor supply increases in Sections 4 and 5 
respectively. Section 6 compares the stated behavioral response from our study with 
findings from other studies. We conclude in Section 7. 
 
2 Data:  The HRS Internet Survey 
The data on individuals’ responses to a 30 percent Social Security benefit cut come 
from a module of the Health and Retirement Study Internet Survey, which is a 
supplementary survey of the HRS.4  The HRS is a panel survey that is representative of 
the U.S. population ages 51 and over.  In the core survey, the HRS collects data on close 
to 20,000 individuals and their spouses in about 13,000 households.  Eligibility for the 
second wave of the HRS Internet Survey is determined by whether a respondent reports 
regularly using the Internet in the core survey in HRS 2004 or HRS 2006.  A random 
subsample of 7,207 respondents qualified, but only 77.5 percent were invited to 
participate in the Internet Survey; the remainder of the sample was retained as a 
control group.  The data for the second wave of the HRS Internet Survey was collected in 
two phases: the first part of the sample (34.4 percent or 1,919 respondents) was invited 
to participate in the spring of 2006 (Phase I) and the second part of the sample (65.6 
percent or 3,667 respondents) was invited to participate in the summer of 2007 (Phase 
II). In both phases, the unit response rate, conditional on being invited to participate, 
was 70 percent.  The stated choice module on Social Security reform was fielded in the 
second phase.  We link the data from our module to the rich information available from 
the 2006 HRS core survey. 
The subsample of the HRS Internet survey eligible to answer the module on stated 
choice is composed of respondents who at the time of interview did not yet receive 
                                               
4
 For more information see: http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/ 
  
 10
Social Security benefits, but who reported a positive probability of receiving Social 
Security in the future.  We discuss in Appendix A the representativeness of the HRS 
Internet sample and our stated choice sample compared to the entire HRS population. 
2.1 Social Security Reform Scenario 
The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program provides 
monthly benefits to qualified workers. Eligibility and benefit amounts are determined by 
the worker’s contributions to Social Security. Eligible individuals can start claiming 
benefits as early as age 62, but doing so may result in a reduction of as much as 30 
percent compared to retiring at the full retirement age (which is 66 for workers reaching 
age 62 in 2005 through 2016). Claiming after the full retirement age may result in larger 
benefits, with the largest benefits being reached when claiming at age 70. There is no 
means test to qualify for benefits, although there is a limit on income earned from 
working that applies to those under the full retirement age (Social Security 
Administration, 2017). 
In our module, we ask respondents how they would respond to a 30 percent cut 
in Social Security benefits. In particular, we provide respondents with the following 
introduction: 
In the next questions, we ask you to think about what you would do differently if 
everyone’s Social Security benefits, including your own, were cut by 30 percent.  
Would you …?   
 
This scenario was introduced after a sequence of questions about respondents’ 
expectations of their future Social Security benefits (timing of claiming and monthly 
amounts). 
A cut in Social Security benefits reduces eligible individuals’ lifetime wealth. It 
also changes the marginal financial attractiveness of remaining at work. Within a life-
cycle framework, we expect individuals to respond to such a reform by (i) working 
longer; and/or (ii) claiming Social Security benefits later; and/or (iii) reducing 
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consumption. Individuals could also decide not to do any of those adjustments for two 
distinct reasons: (i) they have already anticipated a reform and are currently optimizing 
their labor supply and consumption accordingly; (ii) they would spend down wealth 
faster without re-optimizing after the reform (and potentially leave fewer bequests). 
The latter case is consistent with various possibilities, including that individuals are close 
to subsistence consumption and cannot reduce it further, that bequests are accidental, 
or that re-optimizing retirement and consumption behavior is very costly (something 
ignored by a neo-classical life-cycle model). 
 We ask individuals whether they intend to engage in those behaviors should a 
reform be enacted. Figure 1 replicates the screen that respondents see on the survey 
and shows the various options presented to them: work longer (or return to work for 
respondents currently not working), claim Social Security benefits later, spend less 
before retirement or spend less after retirement, and spend the same as originally 
planned after retirement (and thereby spend down wealth faster). While not 
exhaustive, these options represent the primary behavioral changes implied by the 
simple life-cycle model.5  All options deliberately appear on the same screen to ensure 
that respondents consider them jointly when answering.  Respondents can answer 
“Definitely Yes,” “Definitely No,” or “Maybe” for each option.  The answer “Maybe” is 
introduced to allow for the fact that some respondents might still be uncertain about 
what they will do, because their adjustment to a cut might depend on events that are 
not yet realized, such as health events, uncertainty about future earnings, stock market 
performance, or job loss.  
                                               
5
 Respondents could anticipate additional actions beyond those implied by the simple life-cycle model, 
such as changing the investment allocation of their portfolio. Even though these additional actions may be 
considered secondary in importance, the fact that we did not list other options or allow additional 
mentions means that the list is potentially incomplete.  
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Figure 1:  Main Screen from the Internet survey asking about individuals’ responses to  
      a 30 percent Social Security benefit cut 
 
 
 An alternative design could have been to ask respondents to report the 
subjective probability that they would engage in each of these behaviors using a percent 
chance format. This would have facilitated the quantitative interpretation of the 
answers as respondents may use different mappings of the likelihood of an action into 
the three categories we offered. On the other hand, some respondents may have found 
the alternative design more complicated. In the end, due to time constraints in the 
survey and practical considerations at the implementation stage, we opted for this 
simpler design. 
The hypothetical scenario of reform we present does not specify the outcomes of all 
potentially relevant events, so the scenario is incomplete (see Manski, 1999). This could 
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be problematic for the interpretation of results if respondents believed, for example, 
that the Social Security benefit cut posed in the scenario was related to or even induced 
by other adverse events, such as a general economic downturn. However, the survey we 
analyze took place in 2007, before the financial crisis, and at a time where the need for 
reform to make the program financially sustainable in the long-run was widely discussed 
by policy makers, in the media, and also pointed out in the Social Security statement 
that was sent annually to all workers age 25 and over. It therefore seems unlikely – even 
though not impossible – that people would ponder what other circumstances could 
bring about the hypothesized benefit cut and what additional behavioral responses 
might be called for. 
 
For each option that involved a change in behavior and to which respondents answered 
“Definitely Yes” or “Maybe,” we administered follow-up questions to elicit the 
magnitude of the adjustment that the respondent would envision: 
 
• Work longer:  At what age would you expect to stop working?  
• Claim Social Security benefits later: At what age would you expect to start 
collecting Social Security benefits? We also designed a detailed visual elicitation 
of the subjective probability of claiming at various possible claiming ages.  See 
Section 5 for details. 
• Spend less before retirement: Would you reduce your household spending 
immediately or wait a few years with this adjustment? (Answer “reduce spending 
immediately” (Yes/No) and if not immediately, then “reduce spending in how 
many years”); By how much would you reduce your household spending? (answer 
in percent) 
• Spend less after retirement: By how much would you reduce your household 
spending in retirement compared to what you had anticipated it would be 
without the cut in Social Security benefits? (answer in percent) 
  
 14
2.2 Analytical sample 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the 1,020 observations in the stated 
choice sample. About 39 percent of the respondents are male, and 81 percent are living 
in a couple household. Most of the respondents sampled are between the ages of 54 
and 59 (57 percent). About 30 percent have some college education, and 43 percent 
have graduated from college. We define wealth tertiles by marital status using the 
whole 2006 HRS sample. As such, 25 percent of the respondents are in the lowest 
wealth tertile and 39 percent are in the highest wealth tertile. 83 percent of the 








Age <54 22.4 
54-59 57.2 
60 or older 20.5 
Spouse's age 
> 1 year younger 20.7 
within one year 23.4 
> 1 year older 37.2 
High school or less 26.8 
Some college 30.3 
College or more 42.8 
Lowest wealth tertile 25.2 
Second tertile 35.6 
Highest tertile 39.2 
Own health: fair or poor 9.0 
Spouse's health: fair or poor 9.3 
Work for pay (2007) 82.6 
N 1020 




2.3 Basic response patterns 
 Item non-response on any of the options asked on the first screen is very low: it 
is less than 3 percent throughout. Table 2 shows respondents’ answers to the options 
“work longer” and “claim Social Security later.” The vast majority of the population 
either said “definitely yes” or “maybe” to these two possible adjustments in response to 
a 30 percent cut in benefits. More said “definitely yes” to working longer” (34 percent) 
than to claiming Social Security later (20 percent). At the same time, a larger fraction 
would “maybe” claim Social Security later (59 percent compared to 50 percent for 
working longer). That leaves only a relatively small group who disregarded these 
adjustment options (21 percent for claiming later and 16 percent for working longer).
 Table 2 distinguishes the response patterns for workers and non-workers as they 
are quite different. Those who are currently not working for pay are much less likely to 
answer “Yes” to “work longer” (14 percent compared to 38 percent for the workers) and 
to “claiming Social Security later” (8.5 percent compared to 22 percent for the workers). 
 
Table 2: Response Patterns for Working Longer and Claiming Social Security Later, in 
Percent (N=1,003) 
  YES MAYBE NO Total 
Work longer     
  Workers 38.3 49.1 12.6 100.0 
  Non-workers 14.2 54.6 31.3 100.0 
  All 34.1 50.1 15.9 100.0 
Claim Social Security later 
    
  Workers 22.1 60.2 17.7 100.0 
  Non-workers 8.5 55.1 36.4 100.0 
  All 19.7 59.3 20.9 100.0 
 
In addition, respondents who answered “Yes” or “Maybe” to one of these 
adjustments tended to provide “Yes” or “Maybe” to the other (Appendix Table 2). 
Similarly, respondents who answered “No” to one question were more likely to answer 
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“No” to the other. Only 7 percent of respondents said “No” to working longer and “Yes” 
or “Maybe” to claiming later.6 
 
 Table 3 shows the answers to the options “spending less before retirement” and 
“reduce spending” after retirement.  Respondents were more likely to answer 
“Definitely Yes” to spending less in a longer time horizon, that is after retirement. Sixty 
percent of the respondents said “Definitely Yes” to reducing spending after retirement, 
compared to 41 percent to reducing spending before retirement. Like in the previous 
table, the difference in the answer patterns between spending less before or after 
retirement results mostly from complementary variation in the “Maybes” rather than 
from large differences in the ”Nos.” Note that the non-workers are more likely to state 
“No” regarding spending less before and after retirement than the workers. 
Again, there is strong correlation in respondents’ answers to the two options 
involving reductions in spending:  Respondents who answered “Yes” or “Maybe” to 
spending less before retirement are more likely to answer “Yes” or “Maybe” to spending 
less after retirement (Appendix Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Response Patterns for Reducing Spending, in percent (N= 995) 
 Spend less … YES MAYBE NO Total 
Before retirement 
    
  Workers 41.3 50.9 7.8 100.0 
  Non-workers 37.2 40.7 22.1 100.0 
  All 40.6 49.2 10.3 100.0 
    After retirement     
  Workers 61.6 34.0 4.4 100.0 
  Non-workers 52.9 36.6 10.5 100.0 
  All 60.1 34.5 5.4 100.0 
 
                                               
6
 One may wonder how this subsample would finance spending if claiming Social Security later without 
working longer. Further investigations show that this group is not any more likely to have access to an 
employer pension compared to the remainder of the sample, but it is more likely to be in the highest 
wealth quartile (P-value=0.022). 
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 If we compare Tables 2 and 3, we conclude that respondents are more likely to 
consider spending less as an option. For example, only 5 percent would definitely not 
reduce spending after retirement, compared to 16 percent who would definitely not 
work longer. Only 4.6 percent of the sample said “definitely yes” to the last option 
“after retirement: spend the same as originally planned (and thereby spend down 
wealth faster),” which offered another way of saying that the person will “do nothing” 
with respect to spending later in life. In the remainder of the paper we will focus the 
analyses on the first four options which describe whether respondents would adjust 
their behavior. 
 
 We are interested in examining all adjustments simultaneously. However, doing 
so is challenging because we are considering four different options (work longer, claim 
Social Security later, spend less before retirement, and spend less after retirement) and 
three answer categories (Definitely Yes, Maybe, Definitely No). This represents 81 
possible combinations of answers. As noted earlier, the answers to working longer and 
claiming later are strongly correlated. Thus, to reduce the dimensionality, we combine 
them into one category, which we will refer to as “working longer.” Similarly, we found 
that spending less before retirement is correlated with spending less after retirement, 
so we also combine them into a “spending less” category. Appendix Table 3 illustrates 
the definition of the new variables of interest. The variable “work longer” takes the 
value one, if the respondent answered “Definitely Yes” to either “work longer” or to 
“claim Social Security later,” and the value zero otherwise. Similarly, the second variable 
“reduce spending” takes the value one if the respondent answered “Definitely Yes” to 
either “spend less before retirement” or to “reduce spending after retirement,” and 
zero otherwise. We are then left with analyzing respondents’ four possible options: only 
spend less, only work longer, do both or do neither.7 
                                               
7
 An alternative grouping to reduce dimensionality might have been to combine the “definitely yes” and 
“maybe” answers to indicate respondents’ intentions. However, that would have classified 90% of the 
sample as intending to do both reduce spending and work longer/claim Social Security later, leaving little 
variation to study.  See Appendix Table 5. 
  
 18
 Table 4 shows the distribution of answers among these four options. The most 
frequent option is to only spend less, which is chosen by 36 percent of respondents, 
followed by doing both, which is chosen by 30 percent. The least preferred option is to 
only work longer (9 percent). More than a quarter of the respondents did not choose 
“definitely yes” for any of the four options. This includes respondents who reported 
“maybe” and who may then engage in this behavior since less than 2.1 percent reported 
“definitely no” to all adjustment behaviors. As noted earlier, non-workers are less likely 
to consider working longer (alone or jointly with spending less) as an option. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Responses to Working Longer and Reducing Spending,  
      Reduced Dimensionality 
 
  Workers Non-workers All T-test* 
Response N Percent N Percent N Percent 
 Do neither 196 23.7 68 38.6 264 26.3 0.000 
Work longer 78 9.4 7 4.0 85 8.5 0.019 
Spend less 283 34.2 74 42.1 357 35.6 0.048 
Do both 271 32.7 27 15.3 298 29.7 0.000 
All 828 100.0 176 100.0 1,004 100.0   
* P-value for t-test of equality between proportion of individuals working and not working 
 
 
 3  Heterogeneity in qualitative response  
 
 The response to a cut in Social Security benefits is likely to vary by individual and 
household characteristics. We investigate this in a multivariate framework using a 
bivariate probit model. This approach accounts for the fact that the decisions of 
whether to work longer or whether to reduce spending are determined jointly. As 
before, the dependent variable “work longer” takes the value one if the respondent 
answered “Definitely Yes” to either “work longer” or to “claim Social Security later,” and 
the value zero otherwise. Similarly, the second dependent variable “reduce spending” 
takes the value one if the respondent answered “Definitely Yes” to either “spend less 
before retirement” or to “reduce spending after retirement,” and zero otherwise. In 
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addition to basic demographic characteristics, we include among the independent 
variables tertiles of Social Security wealth and of other wealth. Social Security wealth is 
constructed as the expected present value of future Social Security benefits derived 
from respondents’ answer to the question, “How much do you expect your Social 
Security benefits to be?” Other wealth includes all bequeathable wealth, including 
housing, financial assets, other real estate, transportation, and business assets minus all 
debt. It does not include the value of Social Security and employer pensions. In addition 
to current wealth, we include the subjective probability of receiving a bequest in the 
next 10 years to capture a positive anticipated wealth shock. Some respondents may be 
unable to adjust their labor supply due to caring responsibilities, which we control for by 
the number of grandchildren and an indicator for a parent or parent-in-law alive. Finally, 
respondents were asked the subjective probability that over the next 10 years there 
would be changes to Social Security that will reduce their future benefits compared to 
what they would get under the current system. This captures to some extent whether 
respondents think that the presented scenario is likely to happen in the medium-run 
and potentially whether they have already made some adjustments.8 About 30 percent 
of the respondents answered 50 percent, and 40 percent provided a probability greater 
than 50 percent. We include indicators of answers to this subjective probability as 
independent variables. Aside from age and work status, the dependent variables come 
from the HRS 2006 core survey, so the implicit assumption is that they have not changed 
between 2006 and 2007 when the Internet survey module took place. Table 5 shows the 
estimation results.   
 
                                               
8
 See Manski (2004) for an overview of the literature using subjective probabilities. 
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Table 5:  Bivariate Probit Results for Working Longer and Reduce Spending 
 
Work longer Reduce spending 
  Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
  Male 0.023 0.817 -0.183 0.068 
Couple -0.569 0.000 -0.286 0.036 
Age <54 0.037 0.757 -0.156 0.193 
55-59 (ref) 
  60 or older 0.146 0.205 -0.046 0.684 
Spouse's age 
  > 1 year younger 0.380 0.003 0.102 0.425 
within one year (ref) 
  > 1 year older 0.238 0.062 0.263 0.033 
Not working -0.658 0.000 -0.308 0.007 
high school or less 0.043 0.706 0.293 0.011 
some college 0.105 0.307 0.129 0.209 
college or more (ref) 
  Social Security Wealth 
  Lowest tercile 0.162 0.147 0.018 0.869 
Second tercile 0.061 0.565 0.085 0.422 
Highest tercile (ref) 
  Other Wealth 
  Lowest tercile 0.489 0.000 0.289 0.016 
Second tercile 0.166 0.099 0.192 0.054 
Highest tercile (ref) 
  Own health: fair or poor -0.219 0.164 -0.061 0.691 
Spouse's health: fair or poor 0.007 0.960 -0.057 0.697 
Probability own SS benefits cut 
  < 50 % (ref) 
  50% -0.097 0.384 0.143 0.189 
> 50 % 0.170 0.103 0.359 0.001 
Prob of receiving bequest in the next 10 
years 0.002 0.160 0.000 0.738 
Number of grandkids -0.004 0.756 0.014 0.317 
Has a parent alive or spouse has a parent 
alive 0.061 0.587 -0.006 0.957 
Constant -0.381 0.017 0.194 0.229 
  
Number of observations = 982. Correlation between random terms ρ = 0.310 which is statistically 
significantly different from zero (P<0.000). Regression also included an indicator for missing values on 
Social Security wealth. 
 
 
 Married persons are less likely to state that they would work longer or reduce 
spending than single persons, suggesting that spouses may be able to insure each other 
against this financial shock. Note however that there is heterogeneity depending on the 
spousal age difference. Those who are married to a younger spouse are more likely to 
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state they would work longer compared to persons in couple whose spouse is of the 
same age. This is consistent with spouses enjoying retiring at the same time (e.g., 
Gutsman and Steinmeier, 2000), and may reflect the fact that individuals are prepared 
to work longer if their spouse is still attached to the labor market. We also find different 
behavioral responses for individuals with an older spouse compared to those whose 
spouse is of the same age. Contrarily to the idea of joint retirement, those are more 
likely to report they would work longer (coefficient statistically significant at 10 percent 
only), and reduce spending. This may be due to the fact that an older spouse (with a 
shorter work life and life time horizon) offers less of an “insurance.”   
 Non-workers are less likely to report working longer as a response to a Social 
Security cut, which is plausible since they may have lost ties to the labor market. They 
are also less likely to report that they would reduce spending compared to workers. So 
overall, their behavior is less elastic. Persons who are financially constrained are less 
likely to be able to rely on their accumulated wealth to buffer this shock. Indeed, 
individuals in the lowest wealth tertile are more likely to state that they would work 
longer and reduce spending compared to those in the highest wealth tertile. Note also 
that persons with high school or less, and those with lower earnings on average who 
may have already anticipated a long working life, are more likely to report that they 
would reduce spending than persons with a college degree. Table 5 also shows that 
individuals who expect the chance of a Social Security reform to be greater than 50% are 
more likely to state they would reduce spending. 
To assess the magnitude of the variation by characteristics, we compute the 
associated marginal effects. Figures 2 through 4 graphically show the marginal effects 
for the characteristics with significant coefficients in the regression. Each graph shows 
the likelihood relative to the reference group of the four combinations of the two binary 
outcomes: do neither, only work longer, only spend less, or do both. They illustrate that 
respondents largely make adjustments along both the working and the spending 
dimension, underscoring the importance of considering these dimensions jointly. 
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 For example, in Figure 2, respondents in the lowest wealth tertile are 17 percent 
more likely to answer “definitely yes” both to working longer and spending less than the 
reference group, that is, people in the highest wealth tertile. Conversely, those in the 
lowest tertile are almost 13 percent less likely than the reference group to do neither.  
As expected, the response of those in the middle wealth tertile lies in between that of 
the lowest tertile and the reference group. Figure 3 shows that non-workers are 16 
percent more likely to do neither compared to working respondents, and 18 percent 
less likely to adjust along both dimensions. Figure 4 contrasts the response of married 
persons to that of singles and shows that those who are married are substantially (20 
percent) less likely than singles to state that they would adjust along both dimensions, 
working longer and spending less. Instead, they are 13 percent more likely to do neither 
and 10 percent more likely to state that they would spend less. 
 
 













Figure 4: Marginal Effects for Married Persons compared to Singles (reference group) 
 
   
 
In summary, we find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the qualitative 
response to a 30 percent Social Security benefit cut, notably by marital status, work 
status and socioeconomic indicators. 
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Table 4 shows that 26 percent of the sample simply expects to do nothing in 
response to a 30 percent cut in Social Security benefits, at least they state nothing 
definitive with respect to working longer or spending less and give “maybe” response at 
most. We have investigated some channels that may explain the lack of behavioral 
response: e.g., people who expect to leave a large bequest may just consider leaving a 
smaller bequest, or people may expect to rely on (more) transfers from relatives or 
provide less transfers to relatives. We cannot measure these aspects perfectly but we 
do not find any increased likelihood of reporting “do nothing” among those with a 
higher probability of leaving more than $100K of bequest, or among those who report a 
higher probability of receiving a bequest, or among those who gave or received a 
transfer or financial help from relatives (table not shown). 
While we control for respondents being married and for spousal age difference, 
our analysis implicitly assumes that the decision-making is made at the individual level. 
However, for partnered persons, the relevant locus of decision may be the couple. We 
have 155 couples in our sample. It is unlikely that respondents have discussed with their 
spouse their answers to the survey so our stated choice data cannot fully capture the 
joint decision-making. Still, it may be illuminating to look in more detail at the 
behavioral responses of those individuals living in couples. We find that a majority of 
individuals in a couple are in agreement: 62 percent of couples agree on the work 
dimension (18 percent both stating they expect to work longer; 44 percent both stating 
they expect not to work longer) and 57 percent of couples agree on the spending 
dimension (42 percent both stating they would reduce spending, and 15 percent both 
stating they would not reduce spending). Appendix Table 6 is similar to Table 5 but the 
sample is restricted to individuals in couples for which both partners are in the sample. 
The specification now includes as covariates the spouse’s response to the stated choice 
questions. Individuals are more likely to state they would be working longer if their 
spouse stated the same. We do not see any significant effect of a spouse stating that 
s/he would reduce spending. 
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3 Quantitative assessment of the reduction in spending 
Respondents who answered “Definitely Yes” or “Maybe” to the option “spend 
less before retirement” were asked whether they would reduce their household 
spending immediately or how many years they would wait to do so, and by how much 
they would reduce their spending (to be stated in percent). Those who answered 
“Definitely Yes” or “Maybe” to “reduce spending after retirement” were also asked by 
how much in percent they would reduce their spending. The rate of item non-response 
is very low on these follow-up questions (less than 1.5 percent). We use these responses 
to study the magnitude by which households indicate they would reduce spending and 
how these vary by characteristics. 
Most respondents who state they would reduce spending before retirement 
report they would start the reductions immediately (almost two-thirds of the 
respondents). Among those who said “Definitely Yes” or “Maybe” to spend less before 
or after retirement, the most frequently reported reductions are 20 percent, 10 percent, 
and 30 percent. Overall, if we set to zero the reduction of respondents who would 
definitely not reduce their spending, we find that respondents would on average reduce 
their spending by 18.2 percent before retirement, and by 20.4 percent after retirement 
in response to a 30 percent cut of their Social Security benefits. 
Respondents who answered “Definitely Yes” to reducing their spending both 
before and after retirement tend to report larger intended reductions in spending than 
those who said “Maybe,” and they also tend to report that they will start decreasing 
spending earlier. Table 6 shows, for example, that the median of reported reductions 
among those who would “definitely” consider reducing their spending both before and 
after retirement is 20 percent for after retirement, while it is 15 percent for after 




Table 6: Magnitude of Reduction in Spending 
  Before Retirement After Retirement   
  




in percent in percent 
  Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean N 
Definitely yes to: 





Reduce both  0 0.98 20 21.31 20 23.59 351 
Reduce before retirement only  0 1.15 20 18.40 
  
53 
Reduce after retirement only  
    
20 23.40 247 
      None of the above 
      
344 
Total 
      
995 
  
       
Maybe to: 
       
Reduce both  0 2.69 20 19.48 15 18.33 247 
Reduce before retirement only  0 2.45 20 21.32 
  
242 
Reduce after retirement only  
    
15 17.72 96 
      None of the above 
      
410 
  Total 




To investigate how the magnitude of the reductions varies by characteristics, we 
conducted a multivariate analysis. Because reductions in spending before and after 
retirement are determined jointly, we estimate a model of two seemingly unrelated 
regressions (Zellner, 1962), with spending reductions before retirement, and spending 
reductions after retirement, as dependent variables. This model allows correlation 
between the random error terms of the two equations. Note that the earlier a 
household shifts to the lower spending path, the smaller the required percent reduction 
in annual spending to make up for the cut in Social Security benefits. The number of 
years over which spending reductions before retirement would be in effect varies across 
households.  This is because some respondents said they would act immediately, while 
others said they would wait some years; furthermore, the time remaining until 
retirement varies with age and with the (anticipated) timing of retirement. To reflect 
this interaction, we multiply the annual percent reduction and the number of years that 
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the reduction would be in effect and use the result as the dependent variable.9 For 
respondents who say that they will definitely not reduce spending before retirement, 
this dependent variable is set to zero. The mean cumulated reduction in spending over 
all the years before retirement corresponds to 173 percent of the current annual 
spending flow.10 For the magnitude of the reduction in spending after retirement, we 
use the reported percent reduction directly as the dependent variable, assuming that 
the anticipated duration of retirement is about the same across households.11  
Table 7 presents the estimation results. As in Table 5, the control variables come from 
the HRS 2006 core survey, with the exception of age, work status and Social Security 
wealth which are derived from the 2007 HRS Internet module. Consistent with the idea 
put forward earlier that spouses can insure each other, we find that being in a couple 
household is associated with a lower intended reduction in spending, both before and 
after retirement. The coefficients associated with wealth and education are statistically 
significant and indicate that those with fewer material resources or less human capital 
need to make larger adjustments: Individuals with high school or less or some college 
report a larger reduction in spending after retirement than those with college or more; 
those in the lowest wealth tertile report a larger magnitude of the reduction in 
spending, both before and after retirement compared to those in the highest tertile. As 
was found earlier, Table 7 shows that respondents who report a higher subjective 
probability of future Social Security benefits cuts also report a larger reduction in 
                                               
9
 To obtain the number of years that the reduction in spending will be in effect before retirement, we 
compute for each respondent the remaining number of years until retirement (given by the expected 
Social Security claiming age minus the respondent’s current age) and subtract the number of years 
respondents stated they would wait until starting to decrease their spending. This computed number of 
years until the spending reduction would begin is negative for 11 respondents because of measurement 
error in at least one of the numbers used in the computation. For these 11 cases, we set the number of 
years to zero. One respondent reported a reduction in spending before retirement equal to 300 percent. 
We set this reduction to 100 percent. 
10
 Note that a cumulative reduction of more than 100 percent of annual spending is feasible, because this 
is a measure of cumulative spending reductions over several years, but expressed in terms of the flow of 
annual spending. 
11
 In principle, we could also multiply this number by the anticipated average number of years after 
retirement.  However, this would call for computing the household’s life expectancy, because spending is 
determined at the household level.  So, we implicitly assume for simplicity that all respondents will have 
the same expected number of years after retirement. It is therefore just a constant multiplying the 
reported percent reduction in spending that we do not need to estimate. 
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spending before retirement.  We do not find any difference by age in the expected 
reduction in spending after retirement but we see an age gradient before retirement, 
with younger persons expecting larger reductions. We would have expected the 
opposite since younger individuals have more time to make up for the future decline. 
Further examination of this finding reveals that it is driven by the fact that younger 
respondents have a (mechanically) larger expected number of years prior to retirement. 
There is no gradient by age in the reported percent reduction before retirement. 
 
 




Overall Reduction in 
Spending Before 
Retirement 
Reduction in Spending 
After Retirement 
 
Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Male 1.330 0.916 -1.914 0.042 
Couple -49.438 0.004 -2.988 0.019 





60 or older 
-63.369 
 0.000 -1.217 0.257 
Spouse's age 
    
> 1 year younger 
4.767 
 0.771 -0.018 0.989 




> 1 year older 23.320 0.137 -0.402 0.730 
Not working -10.145 0.488 -1.438 0.187 
High school or less 28.938 0.043 2.453 0.021 
Some college 21.172 0.103 1.631 0.091 




Social Security Wealth 
    
Lowest tertile 22.643 0.107 2.425 0.020 
Second tertile 1.576 0.906 1.555 0.118 
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Lowest wealth tertile 58.659 0.000 3.417 0.002 
Second tertile 13.401 0.288 1.611 0.086 




Own health: fair or poor -29.642 0.127 0.030 0.983 
Spouse's health: fair or poor -2.380 0.897 1.892 0.166 
Probability own SS benefits cut 
    




50% 16.766 0.227 -0.369 0.721 
> 50 % 41.332 0.002 1.595 0.103 
Prob of receiving bequest in the next 10 
years 0.028 0.858 0.007 0.541 
Number of grandkids 0.412 0.810 0.243 0.056 
Has a parent alive or spouse has a parent 
alive 12.127 0.388 -0.114 0.913 
Constant 127.715 0.000 18.647 0.000 
Number of observations = 957       
 
 
4 Quantitative assessment of the response to delay claiming Social Security benefits 
 We now turn to quantifying individuals’ response with respect to delaying 
claiming Social Security benefits. We focus on this particular aspect for two reasons.  
First, from the point of view of the Social Security program, changes in the timing of 
claiming Social Security affect the finances and cash flow of the Social Security program 
directly and are therefore important in understanding the implications of the reform 
scenario. Second, the data for measuring the size of the response are more detailed for 
the option “claim Social Security later” than for “working longer.”  
 We asked respondents who answered “Definitely Yes” or “Maybe” to the option 
of claiming Social Security later (see Figure 1) for a point estimate of their revised 
expected claiming age and also for the probability distribution of claiming at various 
possible ages using an innovative visual design. These follow-up questions took the 
following format:   
 
“You said that you would consider claiming Social Security benefits later than 
originally planned.   
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At what age would you expect to start collecting Social Security benefits if Social 
Security benefits were cut by 30 percent? _____ 
<next screen> 
Often people are uncertain about when they will start collecting these benefits.  
On the next screen we will show you 20 balls that you can put in eight different 
bins. Each bin stands for a particular age. Please put the balls in the bins to show 
the chances that you will start collecting at each age.   
 
Figure 5 shows the screen where respondents allocate the balls across the 
various bins. We developed this innovative visual format to elicit individuals’ entire 
probability distribution of beliefs for the realization of an event. (See Delavande and 
Rohwedder (2008) for a methodological assessment of this approach.) A main 
advantage of this approach is that respondents can provide the entire density 
distribution without having to be particularly proficient in the properties of 
probabilities. Respondents had a more detailed introduction to this “bins-and-balls” 
exercise earlier in the survey when we elicited the same detailed probability distribution 
of respondents’ expected Social Security claiming age, but without the reform scenario. 
Appendix Figure 1 replicates the introduction to that earlier elicitation of individuals’ 
entire distribution of claiming ages, and Appendix Figure 2 replicates the training 
example which we included at that time. As a result of these two elicitations—one 
without the reform scenario and one with the reform scenario—we have a prior and a 
posterior distribution for every respondents’ subjective distribution of expected Social 
Security claiming ages. We use this information in three ways. First, we assess the 
aggregate response to the timing of Social Security claiming in the population.  Second, 
we compute how much individual annual Social Security benefits change after taking 
into account that respondents might work longer and claim later. Finally, we 
approximate the net financial impact of the 30 percent benefit cut, taking into account 




Figure 5:  Bins-and-Balls Design for Eliciting Individuals’ Probability Distribution of the 





4.1 Aggregate Effect on the Timing of Social Security Claiming 
 We compute the average distribution of claiming ages in the population with and 
without reform by averaging the number of balls in each bin over all respondents. We 
also include those respondents who indicated that they would definitely not claim Social 
Security later. For them we assign as the post-reform distribution of possible claiming 
ages the distribution that they gave when asked for their distribution without reform. In 
Figure 6, we have converted these population distributions into cumulative 
distributions.  The posterior distribution is located to the right of the prior distribution, 
implying that at the population level, respondents have shifted their expected timing of 
claiming toward claiming later. Integrating over the area between the two distributions 
yields the size of the aggregate response, which amounts to a difference of 1.08 years in 
total. This implies that on average a 30 percent cut in Social Security benefits would 








 One question arises with respect to the group that said “Maybe” to the option of 
claiming Social Security benefits later: what did they assume when allocating the balls 
across the bins to indicate their revised distribution of expected claiming ages? Did they 
provide the distribution conditional on the event that they might postpone claiming so 
that we would need to know the chances that they would postpone for deriving the 
unconditional distribution, or did they provide the unconditional distribution in the first 
place? The question wording gave no indication that they should have given the 
conditional distribution. To shed light on this issue, we compared the difference 
between the prior and the posterior distribution of those who said “Definitely Yes” to 
that of those who said “Maybe.” We find that the Yeses would postpone claiming by 
more than the Maybes (1.5 years versus 1.3 years).12 We take this to suggest that 
                                               
12
 The difference is however not statistically significantly different from zero (P-value = 0.149). 
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respondents who answered “Maybe” did provide the unconditional distribution, which 
is what we assumed when constructing the aggregate distribution in Figure 6. 
 
4.2 Impact on respondents’ annual Social Security benefit 
 The 30 percent cut in benefits may be partially offset by respondents claiming 
and retirement behavior because of two effects: (1) additional earnings entering the 
calculations of benefits; and (2) a smaller early claiming penalty or a higher delayed 
claiming credit. In this section, we investigate the actual change in the annual Social 
Security benefits as a result of the reform, taking into account individuals’ behavioral 
response. This is a simple and useful indicator for the impact of the reform scenario on 
long-term retirement security, because Social Security benefits pay a lifetime annuity 
that is indexed for inflation. As such, they provide a minimum consumption floor should 
the household run out of wealth during retirement.  For this exercise, we restrict our 
sample to respondents who are currently working, because we do not observe the 
earnings of non-workers and lack information to infer their future labor force 
participation.  
 Because the majority of workers claim Social Security at the same time that they 
retire from their jobs (e.g., Coile et al., 2002), we assume that claiming Social Security 
later would also imply working longer by the same length of time. The size of the benefit 
increase resulting from additional earnings will vary across individuals because of 
differences in their earnings histories. For about half the sample, we are able to link 
respondents’ data to their Social Security earnings records, thus allowing us to assess 
the impact additional earnings would have on their benefits.13  Applying the exact Social 
Security formula to respondents’ earnings histories, we compute each respondents’ 
                                               
13
 The probability of a match with Social Security earnings records varies with some observable 
characteristics. For example, respondents in their early 60s are less likely to have a match and so are 
those in the highest wealth tertile. However, the means of outcomes of central interest to our analysis 
like the expected claiming age based on the bins-and-balls allocations, with and without reform, are not 
statistically different from each other for respondents with and without match to Social Security records. 
This finding is in line with results reported in Kapteyn et al. (2006) who compare subjective probabilities of 




Social Security benefit for each potential claiming age and weight the result by the 
respondents’ subjective probability distribution of possible claiming ages using the prior 
distribution (i.e., without reform). This gives us the annual Social Security benefit the 
respondent would expect to receive without the reform scenario. In a second 
calculation, we reduce the Social Security benefit associated with each claiming age by 
30 percent and weight these applying the posterior distribution of expected claiming 
ages (i.e., the distribution respondents gave under the Social Security reform scenario). 
This gives us the annual Social Security benefit that someone would expect to receive 
with the reform scenario (See the Appendix for details on the computation and 
underlying assumptions). We use the individuals’ expected annual Social Security 
benefit with and without reform to compute the change ((SS with reform – SS without 
reform) / SS without reform). Respondents who said they would definitely not delay 
claiming Social Security benefits are assigned a benefit change of minus 30 percent.   
Averaging this change over the entire population of workers (and not just those 
who considered delaying claiming), we find that individuals’ annual Social Security 
benefit would be 21 percent lower on average once we take into account their response 
to the reform. In other words, individuals’ response of working longer and claiming later 
would make up for about one third of the initial 30 percent cut in benefits. Investigating 
how much of this response can be attributed to additional earnings increasing the 
annual Social Security benefit, we find the answer is 34 percent. The remaining 66 
percent of the response result from a smaller early claiming penalty or a larger delayed 
claiming credit.14 
However, the average change in the annual Social Security benefit masks the 
substantial heterogeneity in the population. Table 8 shows the deciles of this metric.  
These span from minus 30 percent, pertaining to those who said they would definitely 
                                               
14
 More precisely, the 30 percent cut in annual Social Security benefits amounts to $5,877 on average, 
expressed in 2007 dollars. Taking into account the behavioral response, the average remaining cut 
amounts to $4,483. About 34 percent or $476 of this difference stems from additional earnings that 
increase the primary insurance amount (PIA), and the other 66 percent or $918 result from a smaller early 
claiming penalty or a larger delayed claiming credit. 
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not claim later, to minus 8 percent at the 90th percentile; the median is minus 23 
percent. 
 
Table 8:  Distribution of Changes in Annual Social Security Benefits Among Workers 













N= 370  
Mean  = -0.212 
   
 
4.3 Overall net financial impact  
 Gauging the overall financial impact of the reform scenario is substantially more 
complex than what is captured in the metric of the change in the annual Social Security 
benefit. For example, the latter misses the fact that by claiming later the individual 
receives benefits for a shorter period of time. Then again, working longer will give the 
individual additional earnings that can finance consumption instead and possibly add to 
savings at the same time. Mortality risk is not accounted for either. We therefore 
compare the present value of the sum of future earnings and future Social Security 
benefits with and without reform. Note that taxes—Social Security and income taxes—
also affect the overall financial effect of the reform, but in a complex manner. We do 
not take these into account in our assessment of the net financial impact, because their 
analysis requires information on the response of other household members that we do 
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not have.15 As in Section 4.2, our analysis is restricted to individuals who are currently 
working. 
 In the present value calculations, we assume a real rate of return of 3 percent 
and a rate of inflation of 2 percent. Note that taking differences of variables that are 
measured with error tends to amplify the measurement error. We therefore focus our 
analysis on median values for this exercise. Table 9 shows the results in thousands of 
2007 dollars, for the entire sample of working respondents for whom we have matched 
Social Security records and also by wealth tertiles.16   
Overall, the reform scenario—after accounting for the behavioral response of 
working longer—would reduce the present value of future Social Security benefits by 
$57,000 (median reduction). Additional earnings from working longer—about $33,000 
at the median in present value terms—make up for some of these losses. Computing the 
net effect for each respondent, we find that the median remaining loss is just under 
$10,000, which corresponds to 3.5 percent of median bequeathable wealth ($277,000) 
in this population.17   
When comparing the effect across wealth tertiles, we find that the net financial 
effect is not all that different, ranging between $-6,400 and $-15,200. To gauge whether 
these amounts represent big losses, we set them in context with the households’ 
balance sheets and compare them to median wealth levels within the wealth tertiles 
that we used for stratification in Table 9. For people in the lowest wealth tertile, the 
median net financial loss amounts to as much as 19 percent of median total wealth 
holdings, whereas for the middle and highest wealth tertile, the net financial loss is 
much smaller in comparison with total wealth (5 percent and 1 percent, respectively). 
                                               
15
 For example, income taxes owed before and after retirement would also be affected by the Social 
Security reform scenario. But assessments of taxes that the household owes would need to take into 
account the spouse’s income history which we may not know, nor do we know how many of the spouses 
would respond to the Social Security reform scenario, because they did not participate in the Internet 
survey. 
16
Wealth tertiles are computed separately for singles and couples to account for the fact that couple 
households have much higher wealth holdings than singles. We also checked for variation in wealth by 
age band, but found that it is not that strong, especially since 80 percent of our sample are in their 50s. 
17
Bequeathable wealth (RAND HRS variable “H8ATOTB”) includes housing, real estate, transportation, 










Difference in Present 
Value of Future SS 
Benefits 
Difference in 









     
Lowest -48.7 28.4 -9.7 49.9 
Middle -57.1 31.0 -15.2 291.3 
Highest -63.3 60.3 -6.4 916.0 
     
All -56.9 32.6 -9.7 277.0 
* The net effect is computed at the respondent-level as the sum of the difference in the 
present value of future Social Security benefits and the difference in the present value 
of future earnings. 
 
5 Comparison with existing studies 
 
Our stated choice analysis relies on the assumption that respondents are able to 
accurately predict what they would do under the hypothetical scenario. To further 
examine the credibility of this assumption, we compare our results to those found by 
other studies investigating the impact of a Social Security reform using relatively recent 
cohorts. This exercise provides solely suggestive evidence as it is hard to make precise 
comparisons between existing studies and ours due to different sample selection, 
timing, places and the set of reforms considered. For example, our analytical sample is 
restricted to respondents who report a positive probability of receiving Social Security 
benefit in the future. No other study would have a directly comparable study sample. 
Nevertheless the comparisons with the findings from other studies suggest that the 
behavioral responses provided by our respondents are plausible.  
 We start our comparison with US-based studies. Van der Klaauw and Wolpin 
(2008) estimate a dynamic programming model taking into account Social Security rules, 
borrowing constraints, uncertain health and survival, Medicare, and health insurance 
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and simulate the impact of various changes in Social Security rules on saving and labor 
supply. One of the changes they investigate is a 25 percent and a 50 percent cut of 
Social Security benefits which is similar to our scenario of a 30 percent benefit cut. They 
look at the immediate impact had a reform been implemented in 1992 and implications 
over the following 15 years for a sample of low income-households (i.e., those who do 
not expect to collect a defined benefit pension plan from a previous job). The total 
increase in average hours worked due to a 50 percent cut amounts roughly to an 
additional year of work for married couples aged 51-61 in 1992, 4.7 months for the 
single men aged 51-61 in 1992, and 2.4 months for the single women aged 51-61 in 
1992.18 This is somewhat less than what respondents report given that we consider a 30 
percent cut.  
 French (2005) estimates a structural life cycle model of labor supply, retirement 
and savings in which future health and wages are uncertain, and taking into 
consideration borrowing constraints. He uses data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics and therefore looks at adjustments over the entire life cycle. He simulates the 
impact of a 20% Social Benefits cut on labor supply and assets. Such a reduction delays 
exit from the labor market by three months over the entire sample. However, he notes 
that most of the labor supply response would be after the age of 62. This is therefore 
not inconsistent with the larger effect we find given that our sample is older and that we 
look at a 30% cut. Interestingly, he notes that the increased years in the labor market 
after age 62 replaces about 21% of the lost income due to the cut, which is what we find 
in our sample. 
Mastrobuoni (2009) looks at the impact of the increase in the normal retirement 
age (NRA) of 2 months per year implemented for cohorts born in 1938 and after. Each 
two months increase of the NRA represents roughly a 1 percentage point reduction in 
Social Security benefits and is found to lead to a one-month delay in retirement. This is a 
                                               
18
 These numbers are computed using the average increase in total hours worked reported by Van der 
Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), from table 11 divided by the annual baseline hours worked from tables 8 to 10 
for married couples, single males, and single females, respectively. Because the average increase is 
computed over all age groups while the increase in annual baseline hours is taken from the 51-61 year-
olds, these reported results constitute a lower bound. 
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larger effect than what we find since a 30 percent cut lead to a delay of 13 months. Note 
however, that there may be framing effects associated with claiming at the time of the 
NRA, therefore magnifying the effect of the reform (Brown et al., 2011; Behagel and 
Blau, 2012; Liebman and Luttmer, 2012). In particular, Behagel and Blau (2012) develop 
a model of retirement that incorporates reference dependence (the reference being the 
NRA) and loss-aversion and show that, under plausible parameters, a reform framed as 
an across-the-board cut irrespective of claiming age (i.e., like the one we consider in our 
hypothetical scenario) would increase retirement age less than one increasing the age at 
which a given reference benefit level is available (i.e., the one implemented in the US).  
In the German context, Haan and Prowse (2014) use a dynamic structural model to 
understand the relationship between life expectancy, the public pension system and 
individuals’ employment, retirement and consumption decisions over the life-cycle, and 
look at reforms designed to cope with the fiscal challenges posed by increasing life 
expectancy. They find that a 26.8 percent cut in the per-year value of public pension 
benefits (a cut that would neutralize the effect of a 6.4 year increase in age 65 life 
expectancy on the Government’s deficit) would increase retirement age by 1.21 years 
on average, which is very close to what we find.  
  
6 Conclusions 
 Social Security is the most important source of retirement income for a large 
fraction of the population. Any prospective Social Security reform to return the program 
to long-term solvency is likely to involve benefit cuts of some form or another. In this 
paper, we investigated how individuals in their 50s and 60s would change their spending 
and/or labor supply if everyone’s Social Security benefits were cut by 30 percent. In the 
absence of data on actual Social Security benefit cuts in the U.S. to identify how people 
would respond, we asked individuals to tell us what they would to do under such a 
reform scenario. We find that three quarters of our respondents report that they would 
“definitely” adjust their behavior in the event of a benefit cut. A little over a third report 
that they would only reduce spending, while another thirty percent report that they 
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would both work longer and reduce spending. About 9 percent would only consider 
working longer as a response to the cut in benefits. There is substantial heterogeneity in 
the response by marital status, work status, education and wealth. 
 In terms of magnitude, we find that respondents would on average reduce their 
spending by 18.2 percent before retirement, and by 20.4 percent after retirement, in 
response to a 30 percent Social Security benefit cut. As for delaying their claiming of 
Social Security benefits, we find that Social Security claiming would be postponed by 
1.08 years on average. We investigate how working longer and claiming Social Security 
later would compensate partially for the loss in benefits among the individuals who are 
currently working under the assumption that individuals retire and claim at the same 
time. We find that respondents would experience on average a 21 percent drop rather 
than the 30 percent drop in the annual benefits. A more comprehensive analysis of the 
net financial effect compares the change in the present value of future Social Security 
benefits to the change in the present value of future earnings. It implies a median net 
loss of $9,700 or 3.5 percent of median wealth holdings. Examining how this effect 
varies by wealth reveals that individuals in the lowest wealth tertile would face a net 
loss that amounts to almost 20 percent of median total wealth holdings in that group. 
The net loss is much smaller in relation to wealth holdings for the second and third 
wealth tertile (5 and 1 percent of median wealth holdings, respectively). 
 The results of this study provide unique information on individuals’ responses to 
a Social Security reform that would implement a 30 percent cut in benefits. Because our 
estimates are not based on data from empirical observations of actual choices in a 
realized scenario, but instead on respondents’ stated choices about a hypothetical 
scenario, there remains uncertainty as to how closely these stated choices reflect actual 
behavioral responses. The high saliency of the Social Security reform scenario that we 
pose to respondents should alleviate this concern. Our results based on stated 
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Appendix A: Representativeness of the stated choice sample  
To find how representative the HRS Internet sample and our stated choice sample are 
compared to the entire HRS population, we compare their characteristics in Appendix 
Table 1. The first column shows the characteristics of respondents from the 2006 HRS 
core who do not currently receive Social Security benefits, the second column restricts 
the sample to those who are eligible to participate in the HRS Internet survey (Wave 2, 
Phase II) and do not receive Social Security benefits, and the third column only includes 
our stated choice sample.  It shows that the stated choice sample and the Internet 
sample are closely comparable.  Compared to all HRS respondents, the stated choice 
sample tends to be slightly more educated and wealthier, but the differences are rather 
small in magnitude, though statistically significant, under the assumption that the 
samples are independent. We should still bear them in mind when generalizing our 
findings to the population since we find larger behavioral responses to the hypothetical 
scenario among the less wealthy and less educated individuals. Respondents in the 
stated choice sample are also 9 percentage point more likely to be working in 2006. The 
stated choice sample is however very comparable to the Internet eligible sample. 
While Internet samples tend to be more educated and wealthier than the general 
population, which is also true in the case of the entire HRS Internet sample, this is not 
the case in our analysis.  The reason is that we focus on respondents who do not yet 
receive Social Security, implying that our sample consists mostly of respondents age 65 
or younger.  At these younger ages, there are no large differences by characteristics 
between Internet users and non-users.  
Note that the stated choice sample is not completely comparable to the other 
samples because the stated choice sample retains only respondents who report a 
positive subjective probability of receiving Social Security in the future, and excludes 
those who report a zero percent subjective probability. This subjective probability is not 
elicited in the core HRS (rather, a yes/no format question is asked); thus, we cannot 
replicate the selection in an identical manner. Some of the differences in characteristics 
might therefore also be explained by this different selection criterion.  
 
Appendix B: Computation of Social Security Benefit Entitlements 
 
 
According to Social Security rules, benefits are calculated as a function of the 
individuals’ top 35 earnings years. A worker’s earnings (up to a taxable maximum 
defined each year) are first indexed using the Average Wage Indexing (AWI) series to the 
average wage level when she is 60 to reflect the change in wage levels that occurred 
during her working life. Up to 35 years of earnings are used to compute average indexed 
monthly earnings (AIME). The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is the sum of three 
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separate percentages of portions of the AIME. The bend points for the formula are year-
specific. The PIA is the monthly benefit the worker would receive if she retires at her 
normal retirement age. If she retires earlier than her normal retirement age, she will 
receive a reduced monthly benefit. If she retires later than her normal retirement age, 
she will receive an increased benefit.    
We use Social Security earnings records, which are available in the HRS up to the 
year 2003. For subsequent years until the respondent retires (i.e., claims Social 
Security), we forecast each respondent’s earnings: starting from the last observed 
earnings, we apply a nominal rate of growth of 5 percent. This growth rate equals the 
average nominal growth rate observed in the Average Wage Index during the 45 years 
preceding 2007, the year of our survey. To the resulting earnings histories, we apply 
Social Security rules:   
• Determine taxable maximum in each year. 
• Index earnings before the age of sixty to the year the respondent turns 60. 
• Choose top 35 years (or 35*4 quarters). 
• Compute AIME. 
 
Up to the year 2007, we use the published values of the AWI, of the taxable 
earnings limit, and of the bend points in the PIA formula for computing the PIA. For 
subsequent years, we forecast these values applying a nominal growth rate of 5 percent 
as we did with earnings. 
For each respondent, we calculate the AIME and the PIA for each possible 
claiming age from 62 to 70. (In this context, the AIME may differ depending on the 
claiming age because an individual who claims later is assumed to have worked longer.)  
For respondents who are already 62 or older at the time of the survey, we perform the 
calculation for each age from the current age to age 70. We use the results to compute 
the annual Social Security benefit associated with each possible claiming age, taking into 
account any applicable early claiming penalty or delayed claiming credit. We also 
calculate the present value of the Social Security benefits associated with each claiming 
age for every respondent using the following formula: 
Proceed in two stages to obtain wealth equivalent 2007:   
a) Calculate present value for year[j] when R claims at age j  
    (SS is an indexed annuity, so discount by real rate of return for any period j+t):   
 ( )( )110[ ] [ ] | 2007 1.03 j t
t j
PVSS j SSB j P aliveat t alive in −
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑  
b) Convert into wealth equivalent discounting from year[j] back to 2007 by  
    nominal rate of return = 5% 
  (2007 [ ])[ ]07 [ ] 1.05 year jPVSS j PVSS j −= ⋅  
 
To construct the survival probabilities, we used SSA life tables for the 1949 cohort of 
men and women, obtained from the Berkeley Mortality Data Base. 1949 is the mode of 




Appendix Table 1:  Comparison of Sample Characteristics between the Stated Choice 






























N=5529 N=3355 N=1020 
Age (2007 internet 
module) 
56.82 56.64 55.94 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.70 0.56 
Years of education (2006 
core) 
13.31 14.38 14.44 0.00 0.47 
Wealth Quartile (2006 
core) 
2.43 2.70 2.70 0.00 0.84 
Work for pay (2006 core) 0.76 0.82 0.85 0.00 0.01 
Work for pay (2007 
internet module) 
(n/a) (n/a) 0.83 (n/a) (n/a) 
*P-value under the assumption of independent samples. 
 
Appendix Table 2: Response Patterns for Working Longer and Claiming Social Security 
Later, in percent (N=1,003) 
  
Claim Social Security later 
  
Work longer YES MAYBE NO Total 
YES 15.55 15.15 3.39 34.10 
    
MAYBE 3.69 37.79 8.57 50.05 
    
NO 0.50 6.38 8.97 15.85 
 Total 19.74 59.32 20.93 100.0 
 
Appendix Table 3: Response Patterns for Reducing Spending, in percent (N=995) 
Before After retirement: 
  
Retirement: reduce spending 
  
spend less YES MAYBE NO Total 
YES 35.28 5.13 0.20 40.60 
    
MAYBE 22.41 24.82 1.91 49.15 
    
NO 2.41 4.52 3.32 10.25 
Total 60.10 34.47 5.43 100.0 
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Appendix Table 4: Scheme for Reducing Dimensionality 
 
 
“Work longer” dimension: 
= 1 if Definitely YES to “work longer” 
or “claim Social Security later.” 
= 0 otherwise. 






= 1 if Definitely YES to 
“reduce spending before 
retirement” or “reduce 
spending after retirement.” 
= 0 otherwise. 
0 
Definitely yes  
to none 
Only definitely yes 
 to working longer 
1 
Only definitely 
yes to reducing 
spending 




Appendix Table 5: Alternative grouping of responses, combining YES and MAYBE to 




Response N Percent 
Do neither 21 2.1 
Work longer (yes or maybe) 12 1.2 
Spend less (yes or maybe) 69 6.9 
Do both (yes or maybe) 902 89.9 




Appendix Table 6: Bivariate Probit Results for Working Longer and Reduce Spending for 
Couples 
 
Work longer Reduce spending 
  Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
  Male 0.120 0.538 0.108 0.578 




 60 or older 0.008 0.975 -0.568 0.038 
Spouse's age 
  > 1 year younger 0.340 0.100 -0.029 0.893 
within one year (ref) 
 
(ref) 
 > 1 year older 0.371 0.122 0.168 0.509 
Not working -0.800 0.001 0.131 0.574 
high school or less -0.193 0.361 0.377 0.068 
some college 0.116 0.539 -0.027 0.890 
college or more (ref) 
 
(ref) 
 Social Security Wealth 
  Lowest tercile 0.101 0.661 0.065 0.761 
Second tercile 0.284 0.161 0.260 0.213 
Highest tercile (ref) 
 
(ref) 
 Other Wealth 
  Lowest tercile 0.344 0.083 0.175 0.380 
Second tercile 0.129 0.473 0.159 0.395 
Highest tercile (ref) 
 
(ref) 
 Own health: fair or poor -0.363 0.238 -0.333 0.287 
Spouse's health: fair or poor 0.159 0.610 -0.400 0.194 
< 50 % (ref) 
 
(ref) 
 50% -0.258 0.221 0.349 0.110 
> 50 % 0.097 0.632 0.400 0.059 
Prob of receiving bequest in the next 
10 years 0.002 0.374 0.003 0.165 
Number of grandkids 0.000 0.996 0.060 0.121 
Has a parent alive or spouse has a 
parent alive -0.009 0.965 0.159 0.460 
Spouse reports reduce spending  0.239 0.164 0.066 0.777 
Spouse reports working longer  0.463 0.040 0.209 0.225 
Constant -1.222 0.000 -0.614 0.062 
Number of observations = 300. Correlation between random terms ρ = 0.337 which is statistically 
significantly different from zero (P=0.001). Regression also included an indicator for missing values on 









Appendix Figure 1:  Introduction to the Bins-And-Balls Exercise 
 
Appendix Figure 2:  Training Example to Familiarize Respondents with Bins-and-Balls 
Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
